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I. INTRODUCTION
1

On August 10, 1993, Pamela Richards was murdered. William Richards, her
2
husband, claimed that she was already dead when he returned home from work.
William Richards was charged with Pamela’s murder, but the first trial’s jury
3
was unable to reach a verdict. After a second trial ended before a jury could even
4
be selected, a third trial also ended when the jury failed to reach a verdict.
In Richards’ fourth trial, the prosecution, for the first time, introduced
testimony from a dental expert that, based on a photograph, there was a human
5
bite mark on the victim’s hand at the time of her death. Additionally, the dental
expert testified that despite some distortion in the photo, Richards had an unusual
dentition that “might” only occur in two percent or less of the general population

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

In re Richards, 55 Cal. 4th 948, 952, 289 P.3d 860, 864 (2012).
Id. at 952, 289 P.3d at 864.
Id. at 955, 289 P.3d at 865.
Id. at 955, 289 P.3d at 865.
Id. at 951, 289 P.3d at 863.
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and appeared to match the photographed bite mark. In response, the defense’s
expert witness testified that after review of fifteen teeth impression models, five
were “‘consistent with’ the mark” and thus the “bite-mark evidence was
inconclusive and should be disregarded, in part because of the angular distortion
7
in the photograph of the mark.” After hearing the various testimonies, the jury
8
found Richards guilty of murder.
Ten years later, Richards filed a writ of habeas corpus when emerging
photograph technology led four dental experts, including the two expert
witnesses who testified at Richards’ trial, to agree that the link between Richards
9
and the bite mark on the victim was erroneous. The prosecution’s expert from
the original trial also conceded that his statement regarding the irregularity of
10
Richards’ dentition was “not scientifically accurate.” Unlike other inmates’
habeas corpus petitions that commonly claimed that expert testimony used at trial
was false, in In re Richards the prosecution’s expert witness had repudiated his
statement and significant advances in technology relevant to the experts’
11
testimonies had occurred.
While the Superior Court granted Richards a new trial based on the experts’
new testimony, the California Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that
because the new testimony neither proved that the original expert testimony was
“objectively false” nor “point[ed] unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability”
12
that Richards was not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
13
Law professor Gerald F. Uelman called Richards’ “novel” holding “the
14
worst opinion of the year.” Legislators apparently agreed, and in response,
enacted Chapter 623 to make it easier for inmates convicted by later repudiated

6. Id. at 955, 289 P.3d at 865.
7. Id. at 956, 289 P.3d at 866.
8. Id. at 951, 289 P.3d at 863.
9. Id. at 974–75, 289 P.3d at 878–79.
10. Id. at 956, 289 P.3d at 866.
11. See, e.g., In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 567, 387 P.2d 6, 13 (1963) (denying the petition for habeas
relief because the petitioner did not show that the false testimony undermined the prosecution’s case and
petitioner failed to challenge the expert’s testimony at trial); In re Kirschke, 53 Cal. App. 3d 405, 413, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 680, 685 (Ct. App. 1975) (denying a habeas corpus petition because the false testimony did not deny
petitioner’s right to a fair trial as petitioner could have rebutted the testimony during the original trial); In re
Roberts, 29 Cal. 4th 726, 746–47, 60 P.3d 165, 177 (2003) (denying a writ of habeas corpus for failing to meet
the standards of a preponderance of the evidence in proving false evidence); In re Bell, 42 Cal. 4th 630, 637,
170 P.3d 153, 161 (2007) (denying a writ of habeas corpus for failing to show a falsity in eyewitness
testimony); In re Hardy, 41 Cal. 4th 977, 1016, 163 P.3d 853, 882 (granting a petition in part for ineffective
representation and denying in part for failing to show falsity in lay person testimony).
12. Richards, 55 Cal. 4th at 966–67, 289 P.3d at 873.
13. Id. at 971, 289 P.3d at 876 (Liu, J., dissenting).
14. Gerald F. Uelman, New Balance at the California Supreme Court, CAL. LAWYER (Aug. 2013),
https://www.callawyer.com/Clstory.cfm?eid=930177&wteid=930177_New_Balance_at_the_California_Supre
me_Court (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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or undermined expert testimony to have their petitions for habeas corpus
15
reviewed, effectively overruling Richards.
Experts are an invaluable part of the criminal justice system, providing
16
“scientifically sound and unbiased testimony.” However, experts occasionally
later repudiate their testimony or advances in science and technology undermine
17
prior expert testimony given at trial. Although criminal cases require a standard
18
of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” wrongful convictions still occur.
Recognizing the need for imprisoned persons to have their convictions reviewed,
the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1473, authorizing the prosecution of a
19
writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus allows the court to review a
conviction if, at trial, the prosecution introduced false evidence that was material
20
to the issues of guilt or punishment.
As science advances, more theories become outdated and expert testimony
21
relying on these theories becomes less trustworthy. A 2009 study by the
National Academy of Sciences found that most forensic expert witnesses
“overstated the certainty of their findings and that some areas of forensics,
including compositional ballistics, bite mark matching, handwriting analysis, and
22
burn pattern analysis, were ‘without scientific merit.’” For example, one of the
most well-known and significant advances in science was the development of
DNA analysis, which undermined many previous methods of analysis and called
23
prior expert testimony based on earlier methods into question.
Prior to Richards, California courts had treated recanted or repudiated expert
and lay witness testimony the same, but the Richards majority “effectively

15. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1058, at 4 (June 10, 2014).
16. Comm. on Med. Liab. and Risk Mgmt., Policy Statement—Expert Witness Participation in Civil and
Criminal Proceedings, 124 PEDIATRICS 428, 428 (2009), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/
content/124/1/428.full.pdf+html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
17. See, e.g., Richards, 55 Cal. at 951–52, 289 P.3d at 863 (noting that the expert who had testified during
the trial no longer supported his testimony and that other “experts agreed, based on newly available computer
technology, that the prosecution’s expert had testified inaccurately at trial”).
18. See DNA Exonerations Nationwide Fact Sheet, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php (last visited Aug. 14, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that there have been 317 wrongful convictions exonerated through DNA technology since
1989).
19. 1872 Cal. Stat. ch. 614, § 86, at 454 (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Radley Balko, ‘Shaken Baby Syndrome’ and the Flawed Science in Our Criminal Courts,
WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/02/21/shaken-babysyndrome-and-the-flawed-science-in-our-criminal-courts/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing
new research undermining the diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome).
22. Radley Balko, California’s Senate Has Approved an Important New Forensics Bill, WASH. POST
(Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/11/californias-senate-hasapproved-an-important-new-forensics-bill/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing COMM. ON
IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY. ET AL., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).
23. See id. (discussing DNA testing and how it has shown the flaws of other theories and methods of
analysis).
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narrow[ed] the availability of habeas corpus relief when the allegedly false
24
testimony was offered by an expert rather than a lay witness.” In light of current
scientific advances and this case, one supporter of Chapter 623 suggested, “Now
that we know that the criminal justice system is prone to error, perhaps it’s time
to revisit the post-conviction emphasis on finality, particularly in cases decided
25
on evidence that science later calls into doubt.” In revisiting the interplay
between repudiated or undermined expert testimony and habeas corpus petitions,
the Legislature elected to make habeas corpus relief easier for individuals to
obtain when expert witnesses repudiate their testimony or advances in science or
26
technology undermine expert testimony previously used to convict them.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
California Penal Code section 1473 enables individuals to challenge their
27
incarceration by filing a writ of habeas corpus. While an inmate may file a writ
of habeas corpus based on any grounds, when false evidence is used during a trial
or new evidence emerges that may establish an inmate’s innocence, courts have
28
granted habeas corpus relief, providing inmates with new trials. In determining
whether to grant a writ of habeas corpus, courts objectively look to the totality of
29
the circumstances. Until the 2012 California Supreme Court’s decision in
Richards, California courts had treated repudiated testimony from lay and expert
witnesses the same when determining whether “false evidence” had been
30
introduced at trial. However, following Richards, petitioners for a writ of
habeas of corpus were required to meet a higher burden of proof when expert
witness testimony was repudiated or undermined than when lay witness
31
testimony was repudiated.
“A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted [if] . . . [f]alse evidence that is
substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was
introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her
32
incarceration.” “False evidence is substantially material or probative if there is a
reasonable probability that, had it not been introduced, the result would have
33
been different.” In contrast, courts may also grant habeas corpus relief if new
evidence is introduced that “undermine[s] the entire prosecution case and point[s]
24. In re Richards, 55 Cal. 4th 948, 972, 289 P.3d 860, 877 (2012) (Liu, J., dissenting).
25. Balko, supra note 21; see also Balko, supra note 22 (calling Chapter 623 “a sensible bill that will at
least address the most egregious cases”).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 623).
27. Id. § 1473 (West Supp. 2015).
28. Richards, 55 Cal. 4th at 959–60, 289 P.3d at 868.
29. In re Sassounian, 9 Cal. 4th 535, 544, 887 P.2d 527, 532–33 (1995).
30. Richards, 55 Cal. 4th at 971, 289 P.3d at 876 (Liu, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 971, 289 P.3d at 876.
32. PENAL § 1473.
33. Richards, 55 Cal. 4th at 961, 289 P.3d at 869.
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34

unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.” Thus, a habeas corpus claim
involving false evidence is more likely to be successful than a claim based on
new evidence because a false evidence claim only requires a showing that there
was a “reasonable probability” that it would affect the outcome of the trial, which
is an easier burden to meet than showing that the new evidence “point[s]
35
unerringly to innocence.”
The California Supreme Court has noted, “Expert opinion is qualitatively
36
different from eyewitness testimony and from physical evidence.” As experts
must usually base their opinion testimony on current “evolving theories,
assumptions, or methods,” “an expert witness’ opinion may change over time
37
without that change implying any lack of integrity on the expert’s part.” In
Richards the majority held that courts should only analyze a repudiated or
undermined opinion by an expert witness under the lower false evidence standard
if it can be shown that the expert’s original testimony was also “objectively
38
untrue.” The court explained, “When, however, there has been a generally
accepted and relevant advance in the witness’s field of expertise, or when a
widely accepted new technology has allowed experts to reach an objectively
more accurate conclusion, a strong reason may exist for valuing a later opinion
over an earlier opinion. If, and only if, a preponderance of the evidence shows
that an expert opinion stated at trial was objectively untrue, the false evidence
39
standard applies.”
Therefore, following Richards, petitioners attempting to classify recanted
expert testimony as false evidence had to not only show that “there [was] a
‘reasonable probability’ that, had it not been introduced, the result would have
been different,” but also both that there have been significant scientific or
technological advances to explain the repudiation and that the original expert
40
testimony was “objectively untrue.”
As a result, prior to Chapter 623, repudiated or undermined expert testimony
was, absent significant advances in scientific research or technological
innovations, considered new evidence and required the individual seeking a writ
of habeas corpus to meet a greater burden than if a lay witness had repudiated
41
their statement or false physical evidence was used against them.

34. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 766, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (1993).
35. Richards, 55 Cal. 4th at 959–60, 289 P.3d at 868.
36. Id. at 962, 289 P.3d at 870.
37. Id. at 962, 289 P.3d at 870.
38. Id. at 962, 289 P.3d at 870.
39. Id. at 963, 289 P.3d at 871.
40. Id. at 963, 289 P.3d at 871.
41. Id. at 963, 289 P.3d at 870–71.
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III. CHAPTER 623
In effect, Chapter 623 amends Penal Code section 1473 to reverse Richards.
Chapter 623 explicitly defines “false evidence” for the purposes of a writ of
habeas corpus to include repudiated expert testimony and expert testimony that is
43
“undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.” Under
Chapter 623, courts will now apply the more liberal false evidence standard to
writs of habeas corpus that are based on repudiated or undermined expert
44
testimony. When this repudiated expert testimonial evidence is “substantially
material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment,” courts will grant
45
habeas relief. Chapter 623 does not limit the remaining grounds for which a
convicted defendant can petition for a writ of habeas corpus nor does it change or
46
create any additional liabilities for experts that testify or offer opinions.
42

IV. ANALYSIS
Senator Leno introduced Chapter 623 to ensure that courts evaluate
47
repudiated expert testimony under the same standard as recanted lay testimony.
Senator Leno declared that the law’s failure to treat repudiated lay and expert
testimony the same was an “unjust distinction” and a “contradictory
interpretation [that was] unreasonable and exacerbate[d] the problem of wrongful
48
convictions.” Chapter 623 makes it easier for petitioners to introduce repudiated
or undermined expert testimony under the false evidence standard, eliminating
49
the court’s distinction between expert testimony and lay testimony.
Part A of this section explains how perjury laws and repudiated and
undermined expert testimony intersect, addressing claims that Chapter 623 was
unnecessary. Part B notes that technology and scientific methodology are
advancing quickly, making more frequent habeas corpus reviews of past expert
42. Balko, supra note 22.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 623).
44. Id. § 1473(b) (amended by Chapter 623).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 1473(d), (e)(2) (amended by Chapter 623).
47. See Press Release, Mark Leno, Senator, Cal. State Senate, Leno Bill Helping to Prevent Wrongful
Convictions Heads to Governor (Aug. 13, 2014), available at http://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/2014-08-13-lenobill-helping-prevent-wrongful-convictions-heads-governor (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting the
different standard applying to experts and lay witnesses).
48. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1058, at 2 (June 13, 2014).
49. Compare In re Richards, 55 Cal. 4th 948, 963, 289 P.3d 860, 871 (2012) (“When, however, there has
been a generally accepted and relevant advance in the witness’s field of expertise, or when a widely accepted
new technology has allowed experts to reach an objectively more accurate conclusion, a strong reason may exist
for valuing a later opinion over an earlier opinion. If, and only if, a preponderance of the evidence shows that an
expert opinion stated at trial was objectively untrue, the false evidence standard applies.”), with PENAL §
1473(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 623) (“‘[F]alse evidence’ shall include opinions of experts that have either
been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been
undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.”).
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opinion likely necessary to root out wrongful convictions. Part C examines how
future courts may interpret Chapter 623.
A. Do Perjury Laws Serve the Same Purpose as Chapter 623?
The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA), in opposition of
Chapter 623, argued that the bill was unnecessary as perjury laws already
50
addressed repudiated expert testimony. The California Penal Code requires that
a prosecution for perjury show that the witness “willfully and contrary to the
51
oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false.”
While an expert witness that knowingly lies in their testimony could be
prosecuted under the perjury statute, testimony an expert believes to be true at the
time could not be grounds for a perjury conviction, as he or she was not making
52
willful misrepresentations. Thus, perjury statutes ensure that expert witnesses
do not knowingly misrepresent scientific conclusions, but do not protect
53
defendants from incorrect expert testimony given in good faith. One California
court explained, “An honest error in expert opinion is not perjury even though
54
further diligence and study might have revealed the error.” Therefore, Chapter
623 extends defendant protection beyond the perjury statute, making it easier for
an inmate to challenge their conviction when expert testimony is made in good
55
faith and is later repudiated or undermined. While the CDAA claimed that
labeling repudiated expert testimony as “false evidence” implies that the expert
56
had testified with “nefarious intent,” Chapter 623 assumes that the original
testimony was made in good faith, protecting the credibility and reputation of
57
expert witnesses.
B. How Prevalent are Forensic Science Errors?
Ronald Huff, Director of the Criminal Justice Research Center and the School
of Public Policy and Management at Ohio State University, along with two
professors of sociology, conducted a study of judges, attorneys, law enforcement
officers, and state attorneys general regarding wrongful convictions in the United

50. See interview with Sean Hoffman, Legislative Dir., Cal. Dist. Attorneys Ass’n, in Sacramento, Cal.,
(July 31, 2014) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing Chapter 623 is unnecessary by likening
it to established perjury laws).
51. PENAL § 118 (West 2012). “An unqualified statement of that which one does not know to be true is
equivalent to a statement of that which one knows to be false.” Id. § 125.
52. Id. § 118.
53. Id.
54. In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 567, 387 P.2d 6, 12 (1963).
55. PENAL § 1473(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 623).
56. See interview with Sean Hoffman, supra note 50 (arguing that the repudiated testimony should be
defined more explicitly as something other than “false”).
57. PENAL § 1473(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 623).
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States. To conduct the study, the authors sent 353 questionnaires to criminal
justice personnel asking for an estimate of the number of wrongful convictions in
59
the United States. Based on these estimates, the authors concluded that courts
60
wrongly convict more than 10,000 people of serious crimes every year. The main
61
cause of wrongful convictions is believed to be eyewitness misidentification and
62
the second leading cause is forensic science errors. When science and technology
advance and expose forensic science errors that led to a prior criminal conviction,
63
Chapter 623 makes it easier for inmates to obtain habeas corpus relief.
In 2004, the State Senate established the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice (CCFAJ) to review the criminal justice system after
approximately 100 prisoners were exonerated when the legislature authorized post64
conviction DNA testing. Through extensive research, the CCFAJ identified
deficiencies in crime laboratory operations, finding that “[t]here are no generally
recognized standards to define who is qualified to perform analysis of evidence in
65
any particular scientific discipline.” The CCFAJ recommended a certification
program for criminalists as well as formulating standards for crime laboratories “to
66
minimize the risk of wrongful conviction[s].” However, the American Board of
67
Criminalists’ certification process remains voluntary.

58. Tom Spring, 10,000 Innocent People Convicted Each Year, Study Estimates, RESEARCH NEWS,
http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/ronhuff.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
59. C. RONALD HUFF, ARYE RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL
CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 54–55 (1996). With 353 questionnaires sent out, only 229 responses were
returned. Id.
60. Id. at 62. The study estimated conservative values by restricting the number of study participants who
were more likely to give higher responses, such as by limiting public defenders to only 9% of the study pool. Id.
at 55.
61. Id.; Understanding the Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
62. Unreliable or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science.php (last visited on Nov. 2, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (amended by Chapter 623).
64. See S.R. 44, 2003–04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). The CCFAJ studied and reviewed the criminal
justice administration in California including research and the views and opinions of judges, lawyers, scholars,
elected officials, and law enforcement to determine how the process has failed previously, leading to wrongful
convictions and executions, and establish ways of making improvements. Id.
65. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON
THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FINAL REPORT 61 (Gerald Uelmen & Chris Boscia eds.), available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing the
changing sciences and technologies).
66. Id. at 58. Criminalists typically have a baccalaureate degree in an area of science such as biology,
forensic science, chemistry, or criminalistics and examine evidence based on scientific methods and techniques.
Criminalistics Information, CAL. ASS’N OF CRIMINALISTS, http://www.cacnews.org/membership/criminalistics.
shtml (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Criminalistics is in the field of
forensic sciences and includes the review of evidence to determine its relevance to a crime, including. Id.
67. What is the American Board of Criminalistics?, AM. BOARD OF CRIMINALISTICS, http://www.
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Supporters of Chapter 623 assert that it allows a remedy for expert forensic
68
evidence that is later disproved or found erroneous. Katherine Williams,
legislative advocate for the American Civil Liberties Union of California, which
supported Chapter 623, states, “This bill allows us to fix our mistakes [and] it
opens the courthouse doors once more so that innocent people who have been
wrongly convicted because of someone else’s error will have a chance to clear
69
their name and regain their freedom.”
Reviews of convictions where modern DNA analysis techniques are
70
available allow courts to discover previous forensic errors. With over 300
exonerations, the Innocence Project discovered forensic testing errors in sixty71
three percent of the DNA-acquitted cases studied. However, where DNA
72
analysis is unavailable, courts have been more reluctant to review cases.
Chapter 623 makes it easier for inmates to have their cases reviewed when DNA
evidence may not be available and forensic science errors may have been made
73
by lowering the standard of review inmates must meet.
C. Does Chapter 623 Create a Workable Standard?
While Chapter 623 makes it easier for inmates who were convicted using
now-repudiated expert testimony or now-undermined “scientific research or
74
technological advances,” the CDAA argued that it is unclear when courts will
75
consider expert testimony “repudiated” or “undermined.”
First, the CDAA were concerned that some experts could merely “change
their minds” and repudiate their testimony, creating a stronger basis for habeas
76
corpus relief under Chapter 623. The majority in Richards also noted that
experts may simply change their mind after testifying and repudiate their
77
statements without any factual basis for doing so. Additionally, one could
hypothesize that an expert witness may, influenced by guilt over the effects of
their actions, simply choose to repudiate prior testimony. The Richards majority
dismissed the claim that there was greater value in an expert witness’ repudiation

criminalistics.com/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
68. See Press Release, Mark Leno, supra note 47 (noting that law prior to Chapter 623 allowed a remedy
for false evidence but not expert forensic testimony that is later determined erroneous).
69. Id. (quoting Williams).
70. See Balko, supra note 22 (highlighting the discrepancy in review of cases through DNA analysis and
other methods of analysis).
71. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 65, at 59.
72. See Balko, supra note 22 (noting the reluctance of the court to review forensic error cases without
DNA analysis).
73. Id.
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 623).
75. Interview with Sean Hoffman, supra note 50.
76. Id.
77. In re Richards, 55 Cal. 4th 948, 963, 289 P.3d 860, 870 (2012).
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than their initial testimony merely because it comes later. In response, the
dissent explained that just as expert testimony is based on the witness’ perception
of the facts, a lay witness’ testimony is also based on their perception of the facts
of the case, yet courts defer to a lay witness’ latter perception when they
repudiate their testimony and as a result, courts should treat repudiated expert
79
testimony in the same manner. Alexander Simpson, Associate Director of the
California Innocence Project, agrees, noting that under the California Evidence
Code expert testimony already must meet a higher standard for admissibility than
80
lay witness testimony. Accordingly, Simpson asserts that after reaching the
standard for admissibility as “qualified to give an opinion . . . he or she is [thus]
81
qualified to repudiate that opinion.”
Chapter 623 merely makes it more likely that repudiated expert testimony
82
will trigger a retrial. As such, it remains to be seen whether courts’ increased
esteem for expert testimony will trigger more experts to repudiate their testimony
for reasons other than to serve the truth.
Second, opponents of Chapter 623 argued that it failed to offer courts proper
83
guidance as to what it takes for expert testimony to be “undermined.” Elizabeth
Watson, Legislative Director for Senator Mark Wyland, who opposed Chapter
623, stated, “[T]he bill should, and could have been, structured in such a way that
it does not open the door for the guilty to receive new trials merely because of a
claim that scientific or technical evidence presented at their trial was less reliable
84
than currently available science or technology.”
California courts have not yet dealt with the novel question of when
scientific evidence or technological advances have undermined expert testimony
sufficiently to justify a retrial, leaving courts with the task of interpreting the
85
Legislature’s intent. However, courts frequently evaluate the reliability of
86
scientific evidence. Further, in evaluating newly discovered evidence as it
78. Id. at 963, 289 P.3d at 870–71.
79. Id. at 973, 289 P.3d at 878 (Liu, J., dissenting) (“There is no reason to treat expert testimony
differently. Just as the truth or falsity of eyewitness testimony under section 1473(b) depends on the truth or
falsity of underlying facts concerning the witness’s perceptual abilities, the truth or falsity of expert testimony
depends on the truth or falsity of underlying facts essential to the expert’s inferential method and ultimate
opinion.”).
80. E-mail from Alexander Simpson, Assoc. Dir., Cal. Innocence Project, to Natasha Machado,
Greensheets Staff Writer, McGeorge Law Review (Sept. 9, 2014, 17:15 PDT) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); see CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2014).
81. E-mail from Simpson, supra note 80.
82. PENAL § 1473(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 623).
83. See interview with Sean Hoffman, supra note 50 (discussing the concerns that Chapter 623 does not
explicitly state the standards that it creates).
84. E-mail from Elizabeth Watson, Legislative Dir. for Cal. Senator Mark Wyland, to Natasha Machado,
Greensheets Staff Writer, McGeorge Law Review (Sept. 9, 2014, 16:40 PDT) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 860, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 426 (Ct. App. 1991)
(“Thus, the defense witnesses’ testimony on the issue of general acceptance did not undermine the validity of
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relates to petitions for writs of habeas corpus, courts already evaluate whether it
“undermine[s] the entire prosecution case and point[s] unerringly to innocence or
87
reduced culpability.” Thus, courts appear capable of evaluating scientific
evidence and determining if evidence undermines other evidence as it was
88
presented at trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Richards held, “If, and only if, a preponderance of the evidence shows that
an expert opinion stated at trial was objectively untrue, the false evidence
89
standard applies.” Under the false evidence standard, “so long as it is reasonably
probable that without that evidence the verdict would have been different, habeas
90
corpus relief is appropriate.” Following Chapter 623, in order to access the false
evidence standard, inmates need only to show that “opinions of experts that have
either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a
hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or
technological advances,” were used against them and that it is reasonably likely
91
that evidence affected the outcome of the trial. Thus, under the more lenient
current standard, inmates now need not show that the expert testimony used
against them was “objectively untrue,” but only that it was repudiated or
92
undermined.
Because science and technology are constantly changing, greater access to
habeas corpus relief for inmates whose convictions are based on repudiated or
93
undermined expert testimony is imperative and ensures that justice is served.
As a result of Chapter 623, on March 18, 2015, the California Supreme Court
94
decided unanimously to rehear William Richards’ habeas corpus claim.
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93. See DNA Exonerations Nationwide Fact Sheet, supra note 18 (stating that DNA technology has
exonerated 317 wrongfully convicted prisoners).
94. Maura Dolan, California High Court Agrees to Reconsider 1993 Murder Case, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2015. 3:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-bite-mark-court-20150318-story.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
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